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Taming the beasts of ‘burden-sharing’: an analysis of equitable 
mitigation actions and approaches to 2030 mitigation pledges 
 
Alina Averchenkova, Nicholas Stern and Dimitri Zenghelis 
 
Executive summary 
International action against climate change has reached a critical juncture in 2014. The 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change re-
emphasised the scientific consensus about the risks posed by rising atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, and has highlighted impacts that are already 
occurring. At the same time, many national leaders have been more focused on 
recovering from the global economic crisis than on tackling climate change. Ongoing 
economic troubles are also causing policy-makers to focus more on the costs of the 
transition to a low-carbon economy rather than on the potential benefits. 
Countries are now seeking to reach a new international agreement on climate change, to 
be signed in Paris in December 2015. A key element of the international negotiations 
since the Kyoto Protocol, has been equity, but discussions have focused on narrow and 
unsatisfactory approaches based on 'burden-sharing' and 'atmospheric rights'. These 
approaches mainly revolve around the assignment of the ‘right to emit’ or, as it is 
alternatively framed, the ‘costs and burdens’ of climate change action. Various proposals 
have been put forward that differ in terms of the principles and formulas applied in 
determining how the costs and burdens should be shared between countries. These 
range from historical cumulative emissions to relative capabilities based on GDP levels. 
Much of this debate, however, has proven divisive and often resulted in the search for a 
minimum acceptable level of individual action. 
We therefore begin by examining the limitations of these approaches by questioning the 
‘right to emit’, noting its tenuous relationship with basic human rights. We further 
highlight the limitations of ‘burden-sharing’, using a leading model to show that different 
approaches lead to largely similar outcomes, and hence add little value. We go on to 
suggest alternative apporaches based on the ‘right to development’ and the need for 
collaboration to take advantage of opportunities. While the outcomes of most of these 
approaches in terms of emissions would look little different from those resulting from 
‘burden-sharing’, the outcomes in terms of economic development would be 
meaningfully different, and would encourage greater ambition and more collaboration to 
improve the affordability of, and increase the opportunities from, decarbonisation. 
In the first quarter of 2015, countries are expected to put forward their pledges on 
national actions (so-called ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ or INDCs) to 
address climate change, which they propose to deliver as part of the international 
agreement. In this context, much of the discussion domestically and internationally is 
about reconciling the urgency and ambition required to tackle climate change with the 
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affordability and equity of efforts by countries. While INDCs may include actions on 
adaptation, the focus of this paper is on mitigation and potentially related actions on 
finance, technology cooperation and capacity-building to support it. 
The main criteria for determining national mitigation pledges are domestic political 
agendas reflecting popular opinion, institutional arrangements, and leadership stances. 
To some extent these INDCs are likely to reflect national circumstances, including (i) the 
cost of action, taking into account natural endowments, such as reserves of fossil fuels, 
or the energy intensity of production (for example the presence of industry dependent on 
coal); (ii) anticipated local damages from climate change; and (iii) the benefits which 
accrue from policies that aim to reduce emissions and that attain other policy goals, such 
as reductions in local pollution, increases in efficiency or improvements in energy 
security. When formulating their pledges, countries will also consider what others are 
doing to ensure comparability of effort and equity. These considerations will then be 
assessed against the global action required to address climate change. 
As part of the process of submission and negotiation of national pledges, countries are 
likely to be asked to substantiate their proposed level of action and to explain why they 
consider it to be ‘equitable’. However, a common definition of equity is unlikely to be 
agreed because individual countries have generally only endorsed definitions that match 
their national intentions or negotiation position. Therefore, the evaluation of pledges 
could be based on a variety of elements, including (i) relative contribution to global 
emissions reductions; (ii) national circumstances; and (iii) comparison with the level of 
effort that other countries propose to undertake. 
This paper seeks to contribute to a re-framing of the debate on the equitability and 
ambition of actions to address climate change. It examines a sample of seven ‘burden-
sharing’ approaches to setting mitigation targets which have been proposed during 
discussions about a new international agreement on climate change. The paper then 
analyses the indicative levels of ambition that would be required by the major emitters of 
greenhouse gases under each of the seven ‘burden-sharing’ approaches, if a particular 
top-down formula were to be implemented. This analysis concludes that, with the 
exception of a ‘carbon budgets’ approach, the resulting levels of mitigation effort that 
would be required from the major emitters under different approaches to ‘burden-sharing’ 
tend to be clustered around similar outcomes. This is because these approaches are 
driven by two factors: the requirement to reach an ambitious global end-point target, in 
terms of limiting the rise in global mean surface temperature, and the growth in the 
economic size of countries and regions. While there are some variations between the 
individual levels of effort depending on which formula is applied, all major emitters would 
need to reduce their emissions significantly below ‘business as usual’ levels. These 
individual approaches, however, are unrealistic in terms of political economy because 
they fail to take into account the national self-interest of countries and their domestic 
political and economic priorities. 
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The paper then presents a broader approach to equitable mitigation actions that steps 
away from the discussion of a fair distribution of the ‘right to emit’ or the burden 
associated with emissions reductions. It focuses instead on the ‘right to sustainable 
development’, including a safe climate, a clean environment with less congestion and 
pollution, secure access to energy, and other opportunities associated with low-carbon 
growth. It recognises the importance of the distribution of the causes and impacts of 
climate change, as well as the different individual historical responsibilities and relative 
capabilities among countries, in determining the level of effort and support undertaken 
by each country. However, it also emphasises the need to enable equitable access to 
sustainable development through consideration of the benefits of climate action. 
Approaches that are based on ‘burden-sharing’ and the ‘right to emit’ miss out a key 
insight, namely that all countries stand to gain some benefit from reducing greenhouse 
gas pollution. 
This paper shows through several examples how taking into account both the benefits of 
climate action and the opportunities to attract investment through collaborative 
partnerships could help to increase the level of ambition in managing the risks of climate 
change, while also advancing other development goals. 
 
1. Rights-based approaches to determining ‘equitable’ levels 
of mitigation 
Most of the discussions about mitigation efforts in the context of international climate 
change negotiations take a top-down, internationally-agreed and quantified objective as 
a starting point, and then apply various sets of distributive justice criteria to determine 
the relative levels of effort required by individual countries. The key attraction of such 
approaches is that they provide certainty about the overall collective level of mitigation 
effort. 
There is no single agreed method that can be used to define what a country’s 
contribution to mitigating climate change should be. Many different approaches have 
been proposed, each based on a different underpinning equity principle.1 These can lead 
to different results, even where approaches are based on the same principle. 
The two most prominent approaches consider a limited ‘atmospheric space’ in 
determining the equitable level of ambition for climate change mitigation. These are 
based on the application of various principles of distributional justice to either the ‘right to 
emit’ (based on resource-sharing) or alternatively to a negative right or a duty to take on 
the ‘cost of reducing emissions’ (based on ‘burden-sharing’). The discussion starts with 
                                                 
1
 For a more extensive overview see Averchenkova, A., and Green, F., forthcoming. The 
philosophy, politics and policy of climate change: in search of a new narrative. Policy paper, 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and ESRC Centre for 
Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
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identifying a global threshold for greenhouse gas emissions (or a global emissions 
reduction target) and then determines an appropriate distribution of this atmospheric 
space or emissions reductions burden among the countries. 
Different principles of distributive justice are then applied to operationalise this approach, 
often through formulas for allocating the entitlements to emit or ‘the burden of emissions 
reductions’. Three in particular dominate the literature including: (i) equality, based on an 
understanding that human beings should have equal rights; (ii) responsibility for 
contributing to climate change, linked to the ‘polluter pays’ principle; and (iii) capacity to 
contribute to solving the problem (e.g. Heyward, 2007; Höhne et al., 2014). Some 
authors add cost-effectiveness as a further potential criterion for determining the 
distribution of effort, although this principle is not based on a particular moral theory and 
is not an equity principle in itself. 
The ‘atmospheric space’ approaches - and the notions of equity, historical responsibility 
for emissions, and capacity to pay - have figured prominently in international climate 
change negotiations. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) states that “Parties should protect the climate system … on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities”. This statement can be interpreted in a number of ways but is 
commonly understood to mean that countries with higher emissions (responsibility) and 
levels of development (capability) should take a greater share of the burden of 
mitigation. 
The ethical considerations upon which operational distributional approaches for 
determining an equitable level of greenhouse gas emissions or mitigation effort have 
been founded include: 
• Egalitarian principle, based on equality in individual right to access carbon space. 
Countries receive an identical amount of permits or quotas to emit greenhouse gases 
in the form of an equal level of greenhouse gas emissions per capita. 
• ‘Historic responsibility’ based on the ‘polluter pays’ principle, which assigns countries 
responsibility for the emissions now and those made historically. With time, the 
cumulative contribution to emissions reflects a measure of some historical emissions. 
There is much disagreement; however, about the timeframe that should be 
considered in determining historical emissions. Some approaches start with 1850 as 
the reference point, while others use the 1970s or 1990s.2  
                                                 
2
 1850 is sometimes chosen as representing the pre-industrial era and the earliest data point for 
emissions estimates (although many of these emissions will no longer be present in the 
atmosphere). 1990 is sometimes chosen as that is the year of the Rio conventions, so the first 
time the world came together to acknowledge the issue. Before 1990, it has been argued, there is 
a stronger case that greenhouse gases were emitted in ignorance of their impact on the climate. 
Since 1990 it is difficult to argue that the world was not aware of the potential consequences of 
greenhouse gas emissions, even if more recent scientific evidence has sharpened our 
understanding of the scale of the risks. 
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• ‘Capacity to pay’ — the principle that countries that have greater capacity or ability to 
solve a joint problem should contribute more than countries with less capacity and 
ability. The mitigation burden is allocated progressively based on the national 
income. 
In recent years, a number of practical proposals have emerged, based on these 
distributive principles, including: the carbon budget or carbon space approach and 
contraction and convergence (based the on equality principle); the index-based/ 
‘Brazilian proposal’ (based on responsibility); cost proportional to GDP and income 
classification approaches (capacity principle); or on a combination of several principles, 
such as common but differentiated convergence (equality and capacity). 
However, there is very little agreement about how exactly these principles should be 
applied and how much more mitigation effort is required from countries with greater 
responsibilities and capabilities. A further challenge is that sovereign states prioritise 
their own interests and therefore these principles are given more or less self-serving 
interpretations by each country. The resulting policies are therefore generally the 
outcome of political compromise rather than the direct application of ethical principles. 
Another major criticism of the ‘atmospheric rights’ approaches is that, by assuming a 
static, fixed-resource distribution, they fail to capture the dynamic aspects of climate 
change, such as uncertainties about the science and modelling (Heal and Millner, 2013), 
and uncertainties about the co-benefits of climate mitigation (Stern, 2013), especially if 
pursued collaboratively, at scale and through well-designed and income-progressive 
policies. We consider these concerns in the following sections. 
 
2. Determination of post-2030 pledges based on ‘burden-sharing’ approaches 
This section evaluates how mitigation efforts beyond 2030 would be distributed among 
the major emitting countries should a ‘rights-based’ or ‘burden-sharing’ approach be 
taken as the basis for determining the level of emissions reductions that individual 
countries undertake. It examines a sample of seven ‘burden-sharing’ approaches 
suggested for the international climate change negotiations, employing the various 
distributional criteria discussed in the previous section. For those approaches where cost 
of emissions reductions is a consideration, it uses the results of a leading model 
operated by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). 
A recent study by Höhne et al. (2013) analyses what the literature on ‘burden-sharing’ or 
‘effort-sharing’ approaches suggests for the level of national and regional targets, based 
on a review of over 40 studies. The study finds that a wide variation in the coverage of 
stabilisation scenarios, effort-sharing categories, timeframes and emission categories 
limits the comparability of modelling results delivered by projects on the different 
approaches to ‘burden-sharing’. Höhne et al. (2013) was used as the basis for figures on 
regional emissions reduction targets that were presented in the Fifth Assessment Report 
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of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. This paper extends that work by 
applying a range of ‘burden-sharing’ approaches to 13 countries and regions,3 all of 
which are members of the Major Economies Forum, to determine the indicative level of 
effort that is required to limit global emissions, under three scenarios with various 
confidence levels of keeping global warming within 2°C, assuming emissions reductions 
are achieved domestically and that there is no trading among the regions. The three 
global emissions targets that were modelled are set out in Box 1. 
2.1. Modelling approach 
The analysis of distributional approaches which are based in some way on the cost of 
emissions reductions was carried out using the Global Carbon Finance model 
(GLOCAF) of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). GLOCAF 
runs pre-defined scenarios for effort-sharing, for a particular emissions level (e.g. 41 
gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) in 2030 – see Box 1), and 
estimates costs for each region of meeting the targets. The focus of this paper, however, 
is on the emissions targets rather than costs of emissions reductions. 
Box 1: Choice of emissions pathway to 2030 
 
There are a range of estimates of what annual global emissions level is needed in 2030 
to be consistent with limiting the rise in global mean surface temperatures to no more 
than 2°C, depending on both the probability applied  to achieving this goal and the 
pathway that is considered consistent with different goals. Some have argued that the 
aim should be to achieve a probability of at least 66 per cent of limiting the rise in 
temperature 2°C, and that pathways should be exclud ed they rely significantly on 
‘negative emissions technologies’. Others have argued that the 2°C target can be met, 
even with relatively high emissions in 2030, provided that emissions fall fast enough after 
2030. To ensure this analysis remains relevant to a range of possible 2030 global 
targets, we have modelled three different levels of global ambition. 
The Emissions Gap Report 2013 by the United Nations Environment Programme 
presents a wide range of possible emissions pathways largely similar to the set used by 
Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the Fifth 
Assessment Report, each of which would mean a different probability of a given 
temperature rise. The Met Office, as part of the AVOID2 research programme, extended 
this analysis, using the final set of emissions pathways published in the Fifth 
Assessment Report, to consider a wider range of emissions pathways that lead to a 
wider range of temperature rises. 
This paper uses the UNEP (2013) median scenario for emissions in 2030 for cost-
effective pathways that mean a 50-66 per cent chance of limiting the rise in global mean 
surface temperature to no more than 2°C above pre-i ndustrial level, based on multi-
                                                 
3
 Due to data limitations, the European Union’s Member States are included as a single region 
and Australia is included in a regional grouping with New Zealand and Papa New Guinea. 
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model analysis. This means that global greenhouse gas emissions are limited to 41 
gigatonnes of carbon-dioxide-equivalent in 2030, and 28 gigatonnes of carbon-dioxide-
equivalent in 2050. Further details about the scenarios and the resulting allocations 
under various distributional approaches are presented in Annex 2. 
The model includes ‘business as usual’ emissions projections and a regional 
specification of abatement costs based on local sectoral opportunities and technologies. 
This is expressed in the form of marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for 24 regions 
(plus ‘international aviation and maritime’, which cannot be allocated to another region 
so are treated as regions in their own right - see Annex 3) and 27 sectors. The emissions 
reductions listed here are for 2030, the most politically relevant intermediate target given 
that the negotiations on the future framework in 2015 are more likely to consider longer 
term benchmarks than 2020. This year also corresponds with many assessments of the 
near-term costs and benefits of action to reduce emissions, including the New Climate 
Economy Report by the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (2014). 
At this point it is worth highlighting the major limitations of approaches based on MAC 
curves. Although the GLOCAF model does allow for some induced innovation, whereby 
costs fall as a result of stronger action early on, it is extremely hard to include the full 
benefits of learning and experience, network externalities and complementarities gained 
from developing and deploying mitigation options at scale. 
A static model based on flows of emissions will also fail to capture the costs of delay. It 
does not measure dynamic costs such as those that result from the lock-in of physical 
infrastructure, institutions and behaviours, or the impacts on future productivity growth 
due to induced innovation, knowledge spill-overs, network effects and other 
complementarities which can lead to scale economies  (Aghion et al., 2014). The 
dynamics of lock-in and path-dependency underscores the urgency of action but are 
mostly absent from this analysis. 
Another feature to note is that MAC curve analysis takes account only of costs at the 
margin and takes no account of the value of the stock of assets. For example, ambitious 
action to reduce emissions will have a dramatic effect on the value of fossil fuel reserves 
and fossil-fuel-intensive assets. The ramifications for wealth are likely to occur across 
investment portfolios and pensions, with the increased possibility of stranded assets, and 
are likely to induce significant ‘terms of trade’ effects, in particular for countries with 
extensive fossil fuel reserves and economies based on fossil fuels (Reilly et al., 2012). 
2.2. Description of the burden sharing approaches considered  
The following ‘burden-sharing’ approaches are considered in this paper: 
Carbon budget or carbon space based approach: A number of studies have proposed 
allocating the global carbon budget to individual countries on the basis of their 
population (BASIC experts, 2011). This approach is based on the distributive principle of 
equal emissions entitlements, which was discussed in a previous section. Countries are 
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allocated an emissions budget for 1990-2050, based on the share of the global 
population over the same period. See Annex 1 for more detail about this approach. 
Index based approach: This approach uses an index to distribute the total mitigation 
needed globally between individual countries. This analysis focuses on one index, 
referred to as the ‘Brazilian proposal’, which assumes that the share of mitigation a 
country needs to implement should be determined by its share of historical emissions 
(UNFCCC, 1997). In this case the period 1990–2020 is considered, while other studies 
have looked at other timeframes. 
Contraction and convergence: This approach is based on the equality principle, namely 
that individuals have the right to emit an equal amount of greenhouse gases and should 
therefore receive an identical amount of permits, allowances, or quotas. A number of 
studies have proposed an emissions approach based on all countries converging to the 
same emissions per capita value by a specified date, such as 2050 (Meyer, 2000). As 
with the former two approaches and the next approach, abatement costs are not 
determinants of emissions reductions, and therefore the emissions pathways are 
exogenous to the GLOCAF model and calculated off-model. 
Common but differentiated convergence: This approach is similar to contraction and 
convergence, but differentiates between countries according to their level of economic 
development (Höhne et al., 2006). In this approach, a pre-determined threshold, such as 
emissions per capita, is used to differentiate between the actions that need to be taken 
by different countries. Those countries that are above the threshold converge to a 2050 
equal per capita emissions target, and countries below the threshold continue with 
‘business as usual’ emissions. Per capita emissions are therefore used as a proxy for 
level of development and historic responsibility. As total global emissions fall over time, 
more countries are required to reduce emissions. 
Cost proportional to GDP per capita: Under this approach, all national targets are set so 
that each country faces the same mitigation costs as a percentage of GDP (Babiker and 
Eckaus, 2005). The principle in this case is that wealthier countries pay a higher per 
capita cost. Mitigation costs per capita are proportional to GDP per capita, making this 
approach equivalent to a flat tax on income, as a higher income country will pay more in 
absolute levels per capita, but the same proportion of its income than a lower income 
country. Because this approach takes into account mitigation costs, it is endogenous 
within the GLOCAF model, which has a regional specification of regional mitigation. An 
iterative process was used in the GLOCAF model to adjust each country’s target up or 
down until its mitigation cost is within an acceptable tolerance of the global average (for 
example, within 0.025 per cent of GDP) and the required global emissions target is met. 
The income classification approach: This is similar to the ‘cost proportional to GDP per 
capita’ approach because it also uses the principle that wealthier countries pay a higher 
per capita cost. Targets are set on the basis of their cost as a percentage of GDP, but a 
differentiation is made between high income and other countries, with the former being 
assigned targets that lead to estimated costs twice the level of the latter, as a proportion 
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of GDP. As with the ‘cost proportional to GDP per capita’ approach, an iterative function 
within the GLOCAF model was used to calculate the targets. 
Equal marginal cost: This approach is not strictly an ethical ‘burden-sharing’ approach, 
but produces a profile based solely on narrow efficiency: the distribution of global 
mitigation is determined purely on the basis of cost-effectiveness as determined by the 
regional MAC curves. Costs are minimised by equating the marginal cost of mitigation 
across all countries. In the absence of a global carbon market, or other mechanisms to 
transfer finance, these costs would be borne by states and regions. However, it is not 
assumed that the final costs need be borne by these countries nor that the geographical 
location of the emissions reductions matches the source of finance. This distribution is 
‘Pareto optimal’ in so far as it is impossible to make any one individual better off without 
making at least one individual worse off. Subscribing to this principle increases the total 
envelope of resources available for distribution under all the forgoing principles. 
Irrespective of who pays the bill for any emissions reductions, so long as trading or 
transfers occur across borders, this approach provides the most cost-effective 
geographic distribution of reductions. 
2.3. Results of the analysis: Potential level of mitigation effort for 2030 
under ‘burden-sharing’ approaches 
The modelling results (see Figure 1), which are presented in full in Annex 2, show that, 
under the carbon budget or carbon space based approach, some countries (United 
States, Canada, Australia) have nearly used up their budget already, which means that 
they need to make very rapid emissions reductions to roughly zero emissions by 2030. 
Other countries, such as India, are allocated a budget larger than their ‘business as 
usual emissions’ projection, and so are able to sell the surplus ‘hot air’ to other countries 
and are not constrained to reduce their emissions. 
Under the ‘Brazilian proposal’ approach, all countries’ emissions are brought below 
‘business as usual’, However, using 2010 as a starting point, countries with 
proportionally smaller shares of historical emissions (India, China) can increase 
emissions in the future. In practice, the large increases in global emissions expected up 
to 2020 are likely to require all major countries to reduce emissions over the period 2020 
to 2030, though at markedly different rates. The modelling shows that contraction and 
convergence requires that all countries’ emissions are bought below ‘business as usual’ 
by 2030, but countries with low per capita emissions (India) can increase emissions 
relative to their 2010 level. Once again, in practice, that margin has been largely 
exploited already, suggesting all major countries must reduce emissions from hereon in. 
However, developing regions, such as India, China and the Middle East, would need to 
reduce emissions by more than in either of the other approaches which account for 
historical legacies. Common but differentiated convergence for many countries leads to 
a similar profile compared with the other approaches, but for India and Indonesia in 
particular, this approach has markedly different consequences. Given their low per 
capita emissions, India and Indonesia have space to continue along ‘business as usual’ 
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pathways for almost the entire period as their emissions remain below the global 
average. However, in practice, since all countries need to take significant action after 
2030, these countries would have to consider taking action before 2030 to avoid lock-in 
that increases future costs. 
Under the cost proportional to GDP per capita approach, the results are similar to 
contraction and convergence, reflecting the fact that income is a key driver of per capita 
emissions. All countries need to reduce emissions below ‘business as usual’, but less 
developed countries, such as India, can increase emissions. Similarly, the income 
classification approach leads to all countries reducing below ‘business as usual’ by 
2030, but countries without a historical legacy (India, China) can increase emissions. 
It is of interest that the emissions reductions required for the ‘global efficiency under 
equal marginal cost’ approach are not too different from those based on other ‘burden-
sharing approaches. However, in general, the ‘global efficiency under equal marginal 
cost’ approach suggests that there are greater opportunities for emissions reductions in 
less developed countries with lower historical emissions than in developed countries with 
larger historical emissions. This reflects the fact that there are proportionally more 
inefficiencies associated with energy and land use in low income countries, which can be 
cost-effectively remedied in order to cut emissions, than there are in richer countries. It 
also reflects the opportunity for developing countries to avoid investment in high-carbon 
infrastructure as they industrialise, urbanise and expand their transport and energy 
networks. Consequently, all countries would be better off if developed countries deliver 
transfers that support emissions reductions in developing countries with cheaper 
opportunities. 
In a world of free trading, all approaches would move from the target starting point to the 
cost-effective distribution as there would be profitable trades. Exploiting such low-cost 
abatement would minimise total global costs. In reality, free trade is an aspiration. There 
are currently a limited number of trading schemes with different levels of stringency (and 
therefore varying carbon prices) and limited access to low-cost abatement opportunities 
in least developed countries due to high transaction costs. However, without trading or 
other transfer mechanisms to finance low-cost abatement opportunities, global costs 
would be much higher. It means that the further away other equity approaches are from 
the cost-effective ‘free trading’ distribution, the greater the risks that countries consider 
the costs to be prohibitive.  
Figure 1. Post-2030 emissions targets under various ‘burden-sharing’ approaches 
for a median scenario of a 50-66 per cent chance of not exceeding a rise in global 
mean surface temperature of 2°C.  
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Source: GLOCAF 
Note: 2010 base year; 41 Gt CO2e global emission target in 2030 
 
This analysis further concludes that, with the exception of the ‘carbon budgets’ 
approach, the resulting levels of mitigation effort that would be required from the major 
emitters under different approaches tend to cluster about similar values. Targets driven 
by formulaic approaches cluster because of the arithmetic, which in turn is driven by the 
requirement to meet an ambitious end-point emissions reduction target. These 
approaches, however, are based on a ‘burden-sharing’ approach to equity, and therefore 
are likely to be unrealistic in terms of political economy because they fail to take into 
account the national self-interest of countries through consideration of national benefits 
of climate action. 
Many variants of these ‘burden-sharing’ approaches can be formulated, each suggesting 
different national targets. No single approach can be said to uniquely capture key 
principles such as a country’s ability to pay or historical responsibility. All approaches will 
differ slightly and there will always be individual countries that are disproportionately 
affected by any one approach compared with another. This underlines the value of 
considering a collection of approaches which offers a more powerful indicator of the 
distribution of equitable commitments based on the key principles of historical 
responsibility and capacity to act. 
The ethical perspectives that underpin the various approaches outlined here, while 
individually weak, are pertinent to underlying ethical issues and convey a collective 
message about what a ‘fair’ distribution of effort might be based on. Taken together they 
India target under 
carbon budget 
approach = +202% 
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provide a more powerful steer than any individual approach and provide a useful 
perspective on the kinds of emissions reduction pathways required, given the arithmetic 
and ethical foundations. They provide a guide to the sort of targets that will be required 
by countries to be consistent with different temperature goals. However, considering 
these emissions reductions solely in terms of ‘burden-sharing’ leads to the omission of 
much of what is important to domestic economic performance in terms of managing and 
benefiting from the transition to a low-carbon global economy. 
 
3. Re-framing the approach to mitigation: Raising the 
ambition level to meet development priorities and address 
climate change 
The previous section showed that the arithmetic of ‘burden-sharing’, for the most part, 
points to the need for decisive action to reduce emissions pathways below ‘business as 
usual’ in most countries. However, framing climate change action in terms of ‘burdens’ 
and ‘costs’ is at odds with the growing evidence about the benefits of investment in 
resource efficiency and emissions reductions. 
To determine what actions countries should undertake to reduce emissions, it is 
necessary to attempt to quantify additional outcomes that are likely to result from a low-
carbon strategy. Many low-carbon policies deliver other benefits besides reducing 
greenhouse gas pollution, including greater energy security, less traffic congestion, 
improved quality of life, stronger resilience to climate change impacts and environmental 
protection. Many can help reduce poverty and improve health. This is in line with the 
arguments presented by the ‘new ways to grow’ frameworks. Countries are recognising 
the costs of a high-carbon model of economic development and growth, in ways that are 
often omitted from the standard academic approaches to assigning emission targets 
using approaches looking solely at estimates of greenhouse gas mitigation costs. 
Accounting for a broader array of costs and benefits will help inform the question of how 
big individual country investments need to be, how they are financed and how 
technologies are shared. 
3.1. New approaches to ‘equitable’ mitigation efforts 
Some new work has emerged recently encouraging a move away from ‘distributive 
justice’ and ‘burden-sharing’ towards a more collaborative approach, involving 
development-oriented partnerships between countries (Stern, 2013; Hedahl, 2013). 
Stern (2013) argues that such partnerships should be based on sharing technology, 
providing finance and supporting capacity-building (knowledge and institutions), which 
offer the potential for mutual gains between developed and developing countries, rather 
than on direct income transfers that have proved politically difficult. 
‘Equitable access to sustainable development’ (EASD) emerged as a political concept at 
the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
15 
  
Convention on Climate Change in Cancún, Mexico, in 2010, having been proposed by 
developing countries as a way to reach a compromise during the negotiations among the 
BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). No clear definition of EASD has 
been developed. Many analysts and negotiators still interpret it in the context of the 
traditional ‘atmospheric rights’ framework, emphasising access to carbon space (relating 
it to the ‘right to develop’ through growing emissions), sustainability and time for 
development, and labelling various ‘burden-sharing’ approaches as EASD (BASIC 
experts, 2011). 
Other authors have suggested that by highlighting access to sustainable development, 
the concept of EASD provides an opportunity to re-focus the international debate on 
climate action, away from the ‘fair’ distribution of ‘costs’ and towards future growth 
pathways and the potential for development to happen in a low-carbon and climate-
resilient way. By focusing on incentives and the benefits of climate action, this re-framing 
may help to overcome the impasse in international negotiations by focusing discussions 
on the dynamic transformation of economies and new forms of collaborative away, 
instead of a ‘zero-sum game’ (Romani et al., 2012; Stern 2013; Hedahl 2013). 
This new discussion goes hand-in-hand with the development of the ‘new ways to grow’ 
framework, which stems from the ideas about ‘green growth’, and seeks to combine the 
objectives of improving economic and social prosperity with environmental outcomes 
(Bowen, 2012). The key features of this framework are its focus on the sustainability of 
growth in the longer term, and on interactions between the economy and the 
environment. It also recognises the multiplicity of market failures that often attend climate 
policy-making. This makes for a more sophisticated incorporation of socio-political and 
political-economy dynamics in policy design than standard public-economic approaches 
focusing on the distributive effects of policies (Bowen, 2012; World Bank, 2012). 
3.2. From ‘zero-sum burdens’ to ‘positive-sum opportunities’ 
Once the framing of the debate on international climate action is expanded from a 
narrow focus on ‘burden-sharing’ to access to opportunity instead, there is a change in 
the incentives for individual countries to act. This is because the evidence suggests 
there is a growing number of worthwhile investments, from the perspective of both 
climate change action and national development, which are not easily funded or 
delivered due to a number of institutional, financial, information and knowledge, 
technical, political and other barriers, particularly in developing countries (CDKN, 2013). 
In this context, the fact that low-carbon investment delivers a global climate benefit, 
alongside a local development one, can provide a case for international support for it. 
Introducing the opportunity principle in the analysis as an additional ethical principle on 
which international action on climate action should be based does not diminish the 
importance of historical responsibility and capability in the way we think about the 
problem of who does what. The rich historical polluters still have a responsibility to 
support lower income but fast-growing countries to move to a low-carbon economy. 
Identification of investment options in developing countries that reduce greenhouse gas 
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emissions, while delivering long-term development benefits, but that require overcoming 
the barriers mentioned previously, makes a stronger case for financial and technical 
assistance from developed and emerging economies. Public climate finance and risk 
management and sharing instruments may be required to leverage private funds by 
bringing down the costs of capital. 
The New Climate Economy Report (2014) identified emissions reductions that could 
deliver 50-90 per cent of the emissions reductions required to put the world on a 
pathway in 2030 that is consistent with the target of avoiding global warming of more 
than 2°C, and could simultaneously enhance economic  performance. However, there 
remains an urgent case for discussing how to address the remaining 10-50 per cent of 
the required reductions that have not been identified as delivering near-term economic 
benefits. 
This section focuses on the growing evidence of opportunities in the context of domestic 
climate change action and the role for international investment partnerships in helping 
realise these opportunities. It does not attempt the difficult task of determining a detailed 
mechanistic process for calculating what is in each country’s self-interest i.e. best for 
individual countries’ long-term growth and prosperity. However, it does lay out some of 
the key areas where action to reduce emissions can drive profitable returns to the 
economy and society. Boxes 2-4 present selected examples of the co-benefits of climate 
change mitigation in several developing and developed countries. 
Moreover, we encourage future analysts to conduct a more rigorous quantification of 
costs and benefits, disaggregated across regions, with the ultimate aim of incorporating 
as much as possible within the MAC curve framework. For example, benefits from 
reduced congestion, pollution and fiscal reform can be illustrated using the MAC curve 
framework by plotting marginal costs against emissions reductions. The New Climate 
Economy Report (2014) presented a global MAC curve (see Figure 2) taking into 
account co-benefits of climate action. In the context of determining and agreeing national 
post-2030 pledges, it would be helpful to have such analysis at the country-level, 
although this would clearly constitute a labour-intensive and time-consuming undertaking 
and would need to be expressed in terms that go beyond the static MAC curve 
representation by allowing for complementarities and spill-overs that determine the 
economic development path. Nevertheless, a heightened understanding and 
quantification of the potential local social and economic benefits would help to inform 
decisions as to the level of emissions reductions that countries could undertake while 
reaping non-climate-related benefits. 
Figure 2. Global greenhouse gas abatement benefit curve 
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Source: New Climate Economy Report (2014). 
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A number of specific sectors where potential non-climate benefits can be derived 
through ambitions emissions reductions have been identified by the New Climate 
Economy Report (2014). 
 
3.2.1 Urban development 
 
Cities are crucial engines of growth and prosperity. They generate around 80 per cent of 
global economic output (Seto and Dhakal, 2014) and around 70 per cent of global 
energy use and energy-related greenhouse gas emissions.4 More compact and 
connected urban development, built around mass public transport, can create cities that 
are economically more dynamic and healthier, and that have lower emissions than 
today. Such an approach to urbanisation could reduce urban infrastructure capital 
requirements by more than US$3 trillion over the next 15 years (Rode et al., 2012). 
3.2.2. Agriculture 
 
Restoring just 12 per cent of the world’s degraded agricultural land could allow 200 
million more people to be fed by 2030, while also strengthening climate resilience and 
reducing emissions. 
While not only supporting the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, efficient livestock 
production offers a number of economic benefits to producers. In areas of Latin America, 
particularly Brazil, where pasture lands have a productivity of just one-third of their 
estimated potential, improvements to livestock production through lime and fertilizer 
pasture treatments, use of improved grass, legumes, shrubs and shade trees can 
support an increase in cattle exports of 50 per cent (Searchinger et al., 2013). Improving 
the quality of fodder and forages is not only associated with reductions in enteric 
methane, it also increases daily weight gains, supporting quicker turnaround as animals 
are ready for market sooner (Global Commission on Economy and Climate, 2014). 
3.2.3. Energy efficiency 
 
Greater investment in energy efficiency – in businesses, buildings and transport – has 
huge potential to cut and manage demand. Market failures and poorly-designed policies 
combine in many economies to distort the efficient allocation of resources, and also 
increase greenhouse emissions. Markets which incorporate the full costs of production in 
energy and resource prices allow resources to flow to where they are most productive. 
Artificially low or subsidised fossil fuel prices, for example, encourage wasteful energy 
use. This means there are both economic and climate benefits to be achieved by 
phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. A strong and predictable price on carbon – achieved 
through nationally appropriate taxes or emissions trading schemes – can raise new 
revenues while discouraging fossil fuel energy use. Policies to promote energy efficiency 
                                                 
4
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that in 2010, urban areas accounted for 67–76 
per cent of global energy use and 71–76 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions from final energy use. 
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can free up resources for more productive uses and, if designed well, can be particularly 
beneficial to people on low incomes. 
According to the International Energy Agency (2013), energy efficiency improvements in 
developed economies have cut the effective demand for energy by 40 per cent in the 
last four decades. No source of energy has contributed as much to both emissions 
reductions and cost-saving. A number of countries and regions, such as Sweden and 
British Columbia in Canada, have used the revenues from carbon pricing policies or 
other sources of expenditure to compensate households and to subsidise energy 
efficiency measures, which can help cut overall energy bills (OECD, 2013). Energy 
efficiency measures could increase the GDP of the United States by 1.7 per cent by 
2030 and programs already in place provide $2 of consumer benefit, sometimes 
upwards of $5, for each $1 invested (Bianco et al., 2014). 
Box 2: Examples of co-benefits at the local level in China 
 
Energy security and energy efficiency 
Energy security is a one of the greatest development challenges in China. A tripling of the 
country’s energy usage since 2000 has accompanied strong economic growth. Continuation of 
past trends would require China to import greater than 50 per cent of its coal in the next 10 to 15 
years (BP, 2013). At the same time, the mining of coal and its subsequent use in energy 
generation requires significant water resources - thermal plants require several thousand litres of 
water per MWh of energy generated and coal plants require sometimes 10 times this amount. 
Water shortages have already compromised 70 per cent of coal mines in China (Wang et al., 
2013). 
 
At the same time, as a result of aggressively pursuing renewables, the proportion of China’s 
electricity generation from coal has dropped from 85 per cent to 50 per cent in the past decade 
and 15 per cent now comes from solar and wind, with another 30 per cent from hydropower. 
Furthermore, it has made nearly double the amount of investments on solar energy, and five 
times more for wind, compared with any other country (REN21, 2014). 
 
In addition, the adoption of energy efficiency measures in China is predicted to increase the 
county’s GDP by 3 per cent by 2030 (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014). 
 
Urbanisation and urban sprawl 
The New Climate Economy Report (2014) cites research from 261 Chinese cities in 2004 and 
finds that, in response to rapid urbanisation, doubling employment density in China would not 
only reduce the increased pollution and carbon intensity of urbanisation, but would also deliver 
gains in labour productivity of 8.8 per cent (Fan, 2006). 
 
3.2.4. Fiscal reform 
 
As noted above, both market and policy failures distort the efficient allocation of 
resources, while simultaneously increasing emissions. While subsidies for clean energy 
amount to around US$100 billion every year, subsidies for fossil fuels are now estimated 
to be about US$600 billion per annum. Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can improve 
growth and release resources that can be reallocated to benefit people on low incomes. 
In addition, a strong and predictable price on carbon can drive higher energy productivity 
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and provide new fiscal revenues, which can be used to cut other distortionary taxes, 
such as taxes on labour or saving. Well-designed regulations, such as higher 
performance standards for appliances and vehicles, are also needed. A recent study by 
the World Bank (2014b) shows that about 40 countries and over 20 sub-national 
jurisdictions now apply, or are planning to apply, carbon pricing (either through a carbon 
tax or emissions trading scheme). A further 26 countries or jurisdictions are considering 
carbon pricing. Altogether these schemes cover around 12 per cent of global emissions. 
Box 3: Example of benefits at the local level in Brazil 
 
Agriculture 
Between 1970 and 2000, Brazil became a top three producer of sugar cane, soybeans and maize 
and achieved a quadrupling of crop yields and a doubling of livestock productivity (Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014). This path of intensification provided increased 
resources for investments in the national agricultural research agency, further soil improvements, 
and crop breeds, as well as in expanding the credit available to agricultural agents and in 
improving rural infrastructure. Following the period of increased deforestation in 1990-2005 the 
implementation of anti-deforestation policies led to a decrease in deforestation by 76 per cent 
between 2005 and 2012. This was accompanied by a production growth in soybeans, sugar cane 
and beef by 29 per cent, 70 per cent and eight per cent respectively (Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate, 2014). 
 
Energy security and financial innovation 
The Brazilian national development bank offers special long-term interest rates for infrastructure 
projects based on a commitment of about US$50 billion to low-carbon energy. It has removed the 
barrier of sustainable energy investment being more expensive than fossil fuel generation that 
would have persisted in the absence of this low-cost financing (BNEF, 2013). This resulted in the 
development of wind projects at a low average energy price of just US$58/MWh in auctions 
(Dezem and Lima, 2014). 
 
Local pollution 
A study by the World Bank found that Brazil’s GDP would be raised by more than US$13 billion, 
and 44,000 jobs would be created, if the country were to divert its solid wastes to methane and 
biogas electricity producing landfills (World Bank, 2014a). 
 
3.2.5. Financial innovation 
 
There is no shortage of capital in the global economy seeking profitable returns 
(Zenghelis, 2012). It results, in many countries, from a lack of public financing capacity 
and the market perception that investments are high-risk. Financial innovations, 
including green bonds, risk-sharing instruments, and products which align the risk profile 
of low-carbon assets with the needs of investors, can reduce financing costs, potentially 
by up to 20 per cent for low-carbon electricity. National and international development 
banks should be strengthened and expanded. 
3.2.6. Local pollution and congestion 
 
Air pollution has also emerged as a major economic and social cost, with outdoor 
pollution alone linked to nearly 4 million premature deaths per year (World Health 
Organization, 2014). The potential for a low-carbon transition to improve air quality in 
particular is significant (see Figure 3). New analysis for the New Climate Economy 
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Report (2014) values the health and mortality burden of air pollution in the top 15 
emitting countries at an average of 4.4 per cent of GDP. For China, this figure 
corresponds to more than 10 per cent of GDP (Hamilton et al., 2014). Substituting coal 
with natural gas and especially low-carbon energy sources such as renewables, 
hydropower and nuclear can therefore lead to major improvements in public health. 
Figure 3. Estimates of health and mortality costs of air pollution 
 
Note: The estimates are for mortality from exposure to particulate matter of less than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM2.5) in 
particular. 
Source: Hamilton (2014). 
 
3.2.7. Energy security 
 
Investment in energy efficiency and clean generation can reduce emissions and reduce 
dependence on foreign energy imports. For example, India imports more than 50 per 
cent of the coal it requires and is likely to face higher import dependence in the future5. 
However, for some countries, measures to promote emissions reductions might reduce 
energy security. For example, countries with plentiful and cheaply accessible coal and 
lignite reserves might need to shift their energy mix in favour of imported fuels such as 
natural gas, which produces half the greenhouse gas emissions per unit of electricity 
generated compared with coal. Additional international support to rebuild energy security 
might be required to make this transition worthwhile for some countries. 
                                                 
5
 See for example Planning Commission of the Government of India (2013). India Energy Security 
Scenarios 2047. Available at: http://indiaenergy.gov.in. 
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In developing countries, decentralised renewables can help provide electricity for the 
more than 1 billion people currently without access. 
3.2.8. Stimulating innovation in technologies 
 
Business models and social practices can drive both economic growth and emissions 
reduction. Advances in digitisation, new materials, life sciences and production 
processes have the potential to transform markets and dramatically cut resource 
consumption. But technology will not automatically advance in a low-carbon direction. It 
requires clear policy signals, including the reduction of market and regulatory barriers to 
new technologies and business models, and well-targeted public expenditure. 
The New Climate Economy Report (2014) argues that to help create the next wave of 
resource-efficient, low-carbon technologies, public research and development 
investment in the energy sector should triple to well over US$100 billion a year by the 
mid-2020s. However, it must be noted that the technology requirements will differ from 
country to country and from region to region. Decentralised distributed energy, as well as 
forest and resource management, may be important technologies in rural parts of 
developing countries, while smart grids might be key in urban regions. This suggests 
that, in addition to direct technology transfers, developed countries may also need to 
support capacity-building mechanisms to allow developing countries to form enhanced 
partnerships with other countries in order to develop and deploy technologies 
domestically. 
Consistent, credible, long-term policy signals are crucial. By shaping market 
expectations, such policy encourages greater investment, lowering the costs of the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. By contrast, policy uncertainty in many countries 
has raised the cost of capital, damaging investment, jobs and growth. In the long run, 
there is a significant risk that high-carbon investments may get devalued or ‘stranded’ as 
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is strengthened. 
Box 4: Example of benefits at the local level in the European Union 
Air pollution 
The mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions to achieve the reduction target of 40 per cent 
compared with 1990 is estimated to reduce air pollution, mainly the emissions of SO2, NOx and 
particulate matter, by 17 per cent by 2030. A reduction in air pollution yields health benefits by 
reducing mortality by about 3.5 per cent, exclusively as a co-benefit of greenhouse gas mitigation 
(Hof et al., 2012). 
Energy security 
Fuel import dependency in the European Union, namely total net imports of fossil fuels as a share 
of primary energy consumption, could be reduced by 2 percentage points from the current level of 
around 55 percent. At the same time primary energy consumption per unit of GDP could 
decrease strongly by 15-16 per cent, leading to further reduction in the fossil fuel dependency in 
the European Union and greater resilience to changes in fossil fuel prices and oil shocks. (Hof et 
al., 2012). 
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4. Financing investment needs through international 
partnerships 
The economic and social benefits outlined in the previous sections are potentially within 
easy reach of developing countries because in general they have relatively cheaper 
abatement options available to them. However, they often lack the resources to take full 
advantage of them, which creates the rationale for rich countries to pay for cheaper and 
more productive abatement overseas in these countries before paying for more 
expensive domestic options. 
If low-carbon investments are fruitful in terms of delivering economic and social returns, 
then it is reasonable to expect some to be funded by fast-growing developing countries, 
such as China and India, which have high savings and developed banking systems. 
However, many of fruitful low-carbon investment opportunities are not easily funded or 
easily delivered due to a number of barriers identified in previous sections. Moreover, the 
returns from investment in emissions reductions are less certain than the costs. In many 
cases the costs may be political or institutional in terms of political opposition from 
vested interests (e.g. big fossil fuel companies or striking taxi drivers).This could lead 
countries to be more cautious when assessing the opportunities from climate action. To 
the extent that the benefits from these investments are also global, the strong case for 
international support for such investments remains, in particular where it helps overcome 
specific barriers. 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, according to the New Climate Economy Report 
(2014), the costs of 10-50 per cent of the reductions in emissions needed by 2030 to 
lower the risk of dangerous climate change cannot be offset by co-benefits. 
In this context, international climate finance flows need to increase sharply if climate risk 
is to be reduced and developing countries are to achieve lower-carbon and more 
climate-resilient development paths. Developing countries will require help with finance 
and delivery and access to technologies, as well as capacity-building in project 
preparation and management. 
The existence of local benefits from climate action does not diminish the strong ethical 
case for developed countries to provide access to affordable finance and support 
capacity-building in low income countries, especially where they cannot avail themselves 
of the potential gains without help. Aid is supposed to finance good projects. Indeed, if 
availability of good projects increases as a result of a more comprehensive assessment 
of costs and benefits, then that increases the case for aid. Aid should not be focused on 
projects with poor social rates of return. Moreover, if conventional aid projects also have 
additional pay-offs for other countries (e.g. because they reduce emissions or alleviate 
the demand on scarce global resources) then the case for aid, particularly in the form of 
access to finance and technology cooperation, correspondingly increases. 
Investment needs can be met not only through traditional climate finance or aid 
channels, but through various other forms of partnerships (Combes and Llewelyn, 
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forthcoming). Cooperation can take the form of information exchange, including about 
best practices (e.g. OECD Country Reviews, IEA Outlooks and the C40 Cities Climate 
Leadership Group). It can take the form of implicit coordination and the sharing of 
expectations, as with forecasting exercises by the International Monetary Fund, or it can 
take the form of more limited multilateral or bilateral agreements, such as the NAFTA or 
ASEAN trade agreements and various G7 and G20 initiatives. Finally, it can take the 
form of multi-country agreements, such as the Marshall Plan (1947), European 
Economic Community (1956), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982); 
the Plaza Accord (1985); the Louvre Accord (1987), and the Montreal Protocol (1987). 
These can be accompanied by corresponding institutional changes, such as the 
establishment of the post-World War Two Bretton Woods institutions, the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later World 
Bank), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the World Trade Organisation) and the European 
Economic Community (later the European Union). Cooperation in the private sector is 
becoming ever more important with globalisation. 
Because international cooperation can proceed at various levels and can evolve from 
one level to another, outcomes do not have to be ‘all or nothing’. Understanding 
opportunities from emissions reductions better serves countries’ interests in pursuing 
various forms of evolving international cooperation than aiming to negotiate purely on 
the basis of an ‘all or nothing’ global agreement based on ‘burden-sharing’. 
This further favours the development of partnerships, not just binary North-South 
partnerships but also South-South, for example in the form of research partnerships 
among developing countries. It also suggests merit in developing sectoral agreements to 
provide a level playing field for trade while supporting structural transition across sectors. 
Examples could include sectoral emissions intensity targets and technology-sharing 
among global steel makers or cement manufacturers, or the sharing of innovative land-
use techniques, with assistance for capacity- and institution-building, as well as 
technologies, coming from rich countries. 
 
5. What does it mean for policy-makers? 
This section assesses the consequences of the preceding discussion for policy-makers 
and considers the potential for moving to accelerated emissions reductions by 
complementing traditional rights-based approaches to international climate action with 
an assessment of the benefits they can also deliver. The conclusions will resonate in 
different ways with different audiences: for treasuries and domestic policy-makers 
interested in promoting economic growth, the impact of green policies on promoting 
efficiency and generating economic returns will be powerful. But for negotiators, 
arguments about equity and responsibility as a means of promoting a fair distribution of 
cost-sharing will tend to dominate. ‘Burden-sharing’ arguments remain pertinent to the 
distribution of residual investment costs. 
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The combination of ethical principles of responsibility and capacity with opportunities 
provides a strong basis for re-framing the negotiations over national 2030 mitigation 
pledges and ‘intended nationally determined contributions’. It also fits with the concept of 
‘equitable access to sustainable development’ and the framework of ‘new ways to grow’ 
or ‘low-carbon growth’ currently emerging as the aspirational basis for the post-2015 
framework in the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. This framing allows countries to go beyond the one-sided (and often 
defensive) approach of determining the minimum acceptable level of their effort based 
on a corresponding share in the overall burden. Instead it may help them to focus on the 
maximum affordable level of mitigation ambition that corresponds to broader national 
interests of sustainable growth and development. 
It suggests that the focus of negotiations on future climate action after 2015 could shift 
away from the assignment of blame and burden, and towards the discussion over: 
• What is desirable from the point of view of avoiding global warming of more than 
2°C. 
• What is desirable and achievable from the national point of view given the co-
benefits of low-carbon investment, national development priorities and 
investment capabilities. 
• The ways to finance additional investment required through international, bilateral 
and other types of partnerships. This could be an important contribution to the 
efforts to raise ambition amongst the biggest emitters. 
• How to most effectively address the 10-50 percent of global emission reductions 
that are not accompanied by economic co-benefits. 
As noted above, targets born of broad equity principles may serve as a guide to the ‘fair’ 
quantitative distribution of emissions reductions, but a broad awareness among policy 
makers and ‘society at large’ of the economic implications of such targets is likely to 
make such pathways politically more feasible, allowing greater scope for integrated 
policy to unlock economic benefits. 
The presence of regional opportunities from low-carbon investment does not diminish 
the responsibility of richer countries to support investment in poorer countries. The 
combination of climate and non-climate benefits and international and domestic 
incentives provides a strong case for partnerships to support pledges and their 
subsequent implementation. Domestic opportunities with global implications require 
coordinated support. 
This paper does not provide reasons to dismiss completely ‘burden-sharing’ approaches 
to international action on climate change, but rather points to the potential limitations of 
ignoring the economic and social co-benefits of reducing carbon emissions. Indeed, 
‘burden-sharing’ could help to provide an initial assessment of domestic commitments, 
while recognising that new opportunities provide the potential to increase global ambition 
while promoting local development. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that several 
countries are thinking about their domestic transition as part of a global shift to low-
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carbon. This can be seen in the European Union’s roadmap to 2050, the UK’s carbon 
budgets, California’s renewable energy mandates, Korea’s green growth ambitions and 
China’s development of renewable and energy efficiency technologies. Delay, ‘burden-
sharing’ and self-interest are not the only drivers to international agreements. Country 
and regional incentives are for more complex and multi-dimensional than just a race to 
be the last to move. 
In this context, specific practical steps to consider for developing countries at the 
national level could include: 
(i) Identifying and prioritising mitigation opportunities and the associated co-benefits 
in relation national and sectoral development goals. 
(ii) Determining what part of these emission reductions can be implemented with 
domestic resources and investment, taking into account local co-benefits and 
also the level of effort that would be required as a minimum based on a 
combination of ‘burden-sharing’ approaches (using the latter as a guide to what 
may be expected in terms of the level of effort by other countries). 
(iii) Identifying additional emissions reductions that can be achieved with financial, 
technological and capacity-building support (to remove the associated barriers), 
which carry high risks, or which entail political economy, rather than pure 
economic, costs. 
(iv) Negotiating with developed and emerging economies (and also with other non-
state partners) about support for a more ambitious levels of action, including 
actions not necessarily offset by opportunities. This support must in part be 
based on ethical responsibilities, such as historical responsibility, egalitarian 
principles and ability to pay. This can take the form of aid, technology 
cooperation, capacity-building, climate finance and other types of partnerships. 
(v) Focusing on the co-benefits of reducing carbon emissions to build domestic 
political support. 
The basic steps for developed countries and emerging economies are similar, in that 
they should also go through steps (i)-(iii) and (v), and, in addition, determine 
opportunities for helping to reduce emissions and foster economic growth and poverty 
eradication in developing countries. This means that under step (iv) they should 
negotiate with developing countries and other partners about opportunities to help 
achieve cheaper mitigation through carbon markets and other forms of partnerships, as 
discussed earlier. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper concludes that equity expressed as responsibility, equality and capability, 
remain important criteria for considering the appropriate and fair share of mitigation 
actions for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. The results of the analysis 
presented here show that for the most part, the outcomes differ little between a variety of 
‘burden-sharing’ approaches. In all regions, such approaches mean emissions 
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reductions are determined as a matter of arithmetic - driven by the ambitious end-point 
target and the growth in economic size of each region. These effects swamp the ethical 
considerations in determining the distribution of emissions reductions. This suggests 
that, when taken together, various ‘burden-sharing’ approaches give a reasonable 
approximation of the sort of target that could be both effective and fair to deliver a given 
goal. 
However, it has become increasingly clear that the standard technology-cost-based 
MAC approach in isolation is too limited. There is a growing recognition that there are 
strong opportunities for social and economic returns from investment in emissions 
reduction for many developing countries that are not captured in narrow MAC analysis. 
Recognising these opportunities strengthens the case for climate action in most regions, 
but does not diminish the responsibility of rich countries to support such a transition 
through technology cooperation, financing and capacity-building. Indeed, investing in 
domestic opportunities with global implications in terms of reduced emissions requires 
coordinated support. 
Recent evidence suggests that more than half of emissions reductions required to meet 
an ambitious target generate co-benefits. For the remaining emissions reductions that do 
not, the principles of ‘burden-sharing’ and responsibility have a role in determining their 
distribution. Some countries should take greater responsibility for securing a safe level of 
the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases, reflecting their wealth and their historical 
legacy in contributing to the problem. However, this paper finds that it is, in practice, 
more helpful to look at this from the perspective of growth and poverty reduction in order 
to successfully take advantage of the many forms of beneficial international cooperation. 
Although more work is required to test this proposition, the distribution of mitigation 
actions that generate net economic benefits (separate from climate benefits) is unlikely 
to be so unbalanced across countries as to lead to a large shift in the targets required to 
deliver a given temperature goal. This means that, even before a thorough exploration of 
these benefits at a national and global level, the targets set out in the first half of this 
paper can still act as an approximate guide to the level of mitigation that is appropriate at 
national level to deliver the goal. However, the existence of these benefits means that 
policy-makers should be less reluctant when considering undertaking such targets. 
The ultimate aim of international cooperation in the form of finance, technology 
cooperation and sectoral partnerships is the support of projects with high domestic 
returns and global climate benefits. All things being equal, if the availability of good 
emissions reduction projects goes up as a result of the recognition of new opportunities, 
it increases the case for supporting the diffusion of technologies, capacity- and 
institution-building and access to cheap finance. 
The findings presented here highlight the need to move away from the narrow principles 
of ‘burden-sharing’, and towards incorporating the principles of equitable access to 
sustainable development and new ways to grow. They suggest that there are additional 
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incentives for all countries to strive for and secure an ambitious and comprehensive 
international agreement to reduce emissions. 
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Annex 1: Detailed description of ‘burden-sharing’ approaches 
The GLOCAF model includes ‘business as usual’ (BAU) emissions projections and MAC 
curves for 24 regions (plus international aviation and maritime, which cannot be 
allocated to another region so are treated as regions in their own right), and 27 sectors. 
Modelled data used to produce GLOCAF inputs are calibrated to approximate published 
IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2013 Current Policies Scenario data. This means that 
projected totals used for data categories, such as regional level BAU projections, energy 
demand and power generation, will be similar to the WEO figures. The BAU data and 
MAC curves were procured through competitive tender from an international energy 
consultancy (Enerdata) for power and CO2 sectors, from the Dutch Energy Agency for 
non-CO2 gas sectors (Lucas et al., 2007), and from IIASA for forestry and land-use 
sectors (Kinderman et al., 2008; see Annex 3 for bunkers and peat). 
The WEO 2013 Current Policies Scenario does not necessarily take into account all of 
the policies and measures countries have implemented. The analysis presented here 
therefore uses a Current Action policy scenario to estimate emissions in 2020, to ensure 
the analysis of post-2020 action uses an appropriate starting point. The assumptions 
made include that the European Union delivers a 21 per cent reduction compared with 
1990 emissions, the United States meets its 17 per cent 2020 target and China delivers 
the measure included in the IEA WEO 2013 New Polices scenario. These policy 
assumptions lead to global emissions in 2020 being 3.6 gigatonnes (6 per cent) lower 
than BAU. 
1. Carbon budget or carbon space based approach 
For this analysis, the approach has been implemented as follows: 
a) All countries are allocated an emissions budget for 1990-2050, based on the 
share of the global population over the same period.6  
b) Each country’s remaining budget is calculated for the period 2021-2050 by 
subtracting its historical and projected emissions for the period 1990-2020 from 
its allocated budget. 
c) Each country is given a linear emissions trajectory for the period 2021-2050 
which ensures the total emissions for the period 1990-2050 match the global 
budget. 
d) To ensure the total global emissions match the relevant global target and enable 
a direct comparison between the 2030 targets suggested by different 
approaches, each country’s emissions are pro-rated up or down so the global 
                                                 
6
 A country’s share of global population is calculated as the sum of population for each year for 
the period 1990–2050. 1990 is used as a base year throughout these approaches due to the Rio 
Convention acting as a clear milestone for historical responsibility. Using an earlier time reference 
point will accentuate the extent to which the poorest developing countries have a large surplus of 
emissions and the highest emitting countries have exhausted their allocation. Allocating only 
future emissions has the opposite effect but still means developed countries would exhaust their 
allocation in the coming decades and surpluses for the lowest emitters. 
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total is the same (e.g. 41Gt). The 2030-2050 trajectory is subsequently 
recalculated, although this has no impact on the 2030 results. 
2. Index based approach 
This analysis assumes that the share of mitigation a country needs to implement should 
be determined by its share of historical emissions in the period 19907–2020. The 
calculations are as follows: 
a) The total mitigation needed is calculated as the difference between the global 
BAU emissions projection and the global target. 
b) Each country’s share of historical emission is calculated, based on cumulative 
emissions from 1990 to 2020. 
c) The share of historical emissions is used to determine the quantity of mitigation 
(in Mt) each country needs to deliver. This is subtracted from their BAU projection 
to establish their 2030 targets. 
3. Contraction and convergence 
The calculation steps used in this analysis are: 
a) The 20508 convergence point is calculated by dividing the global emissions target 
by projected population in 2050.  
b) Each country is given a 2050 target based on the convergence point multiplied by 
its projected population, and a linear emissions path from 2020 to its 2050 target. 
c) To ensure the total global emissions match the 2030 global target (e.g. 41Gt) and 
to comparisons between the 2030 targets suggested by different approaches, 
each country’s emissions are adjusted up or down. 
This approach takes no account of historical emissions (although to some extent there is 
a correlation between historical emissions and current per capita emissions). Abatement 
costs are not determinants of emissions reductions and therefore the paths are 
exogenous to the GLOCAF model and are simply calculated off-model. 
4. Common but differentiated convergence 
This analysis uses global average per capita emissions as the threshold. Countries 
above the threshold converge to a 2050 equal per capita emissions target, and countries 
below the threshold continue with BAU emissions. Per capita emissions are therefore 
used a proxy for level of economic development. 
The approach has been implemented as follows: 
                                                 
7
 The choice of base year still has an impact although it is far less pronounced than in carbon 
space based approaches as the share of total emissions shifts less over time (compared to the 
carbon space approach in which going further back exhausts more of the future allocation). 
8
 Other target years for convergence could be used but 2050 is the one usually cited in the 
literature. 
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a) The 2050 convergence point is calculated by dividing the global emissions target 
by projected population in 2050. 
b) Countries with emissions per capita above the global average are allocated a 
linear trajectory to their 2050 targets (based on the target per capita emissions 
multiplied by their projected population). 
c) Countries with emissions per capita below the global average continue with BAU 
emissions, until they cross the threshold, at which point they also converge to the 
same per capita emissions by 2050. 
d) To ensure the total global emissions match the 2030 global target (e.g. 41Gt), the 
emissions of countries above the threshold are adjusted up or down. 
5. Cost proportional to GDP per capita 
Under this approach all country targets are set so that each country faces the same 
mitigation costs measured as a percentage of GDP. The principle is that wealthier 
countries pay a higher per capita cost. Mitigation costs per capita are proportional to 
GDP per capita, making this approach equivalent to a flat tax as a higher income country 
will pay more in absolute levels per capita but the same proportion of their income as a 
lower income country. Because this approach takes into account mitigation costs, it is 
therefore endogenous to the GLOCAF model, which has a regional specification of 
regional mitigation. An iterative process was used within the GLOCAF model to adjust 
each country’s target up or down until its mitigation costs are within an acceptable 
tolerance of the global average (e.g. within 0.025 per cent of GDP) and the required 
global emission target is met. 
6. Income classification approach 
This is similar to the ‘cost proportional to GDP per capita’ approach, with the principle 
that wealthier countries pay a higher per capita cost. Targets are set on the basis of their 
cost as a percentage of GDP, but a differentiation is made between high income and 
other countries, with the former being assigned targets that lead to estimated costs that 
are twice the level of those for the latter, as a portion of GDP. The high income grouping 
was based on the World Bank income group classifications. As with the previous 
approach, an iterative function within the GLOCAF model was used to calculate the 
targets. Again, all countries should reduce emissions below BAU, but countries without a 
historical legacy (India, China) can increase emissions. 
7. Equal marginal cost  
This approach is not strictly an ethical ‘burden-sharing’ approach, but creates a profile 
based solely on narrow efficiency. It simply distributes emissions reductions across 
regions and sectors in a way that minimises the global total costs by equating the 
marginal cost of mitigation across all countries. This means that no given amount of 
emissions abatement can be made cheaper anywhere in the world. This is not so much 
an equity principle as an efficiency principle: the distribution of global mitigation is 
determined purely on the basis of cost-effectiveness as determined by the regional MAC 
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curves. All the most cost-effective projects internationally are selected. In the absence of 
a global carbon market, these costs would be borne by states and regions. 
The GLOCAF model was used to calculate the amount of abatement each country would 
deliver for the uniform global carbon price that would be necessary to meet the global 
emissions reductions target. The model gradually raises the carbon price until enough 
abatement has been carried out to meet the global target. The end result is that the 
marginal cost of mitigation9 is the same across all countries. 
 
                                                 
9
 The extra cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 1 tonne. 
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Annex 2: Modelling results: Indicative mitigation effort by major emitters under various distributive approaches 
Table 1 Modelling scenarios 
Scenario 2030 emissions  
(Gt CO2e) 
2050 emissions  
(Gt CO2e) 
Description 
A 34 20 The median level of emissions in 2030 for pathways that deliver a 
greater than 66% chance of limiting temperature rise to 2°C, 
excluding those pathways that require the deployment of substantial 
negative emissions technologies10. 
B 41 28 The median level of emissions in 2030 for pathways that deliver a 
50-66% chance of limiting temperature rise to 2°C 11. 
C 53 36 The median level of emissions in 2030 for pathways that deliver a 
50-66% chance of limiting temperature rise to 2.5°C . This is also 
within the upper limit of the pathways that deliver a 50-66% chance 
of limiting temperature rise to 2°C, based on the U NEP (2013) 
report12. 
 
                                                 
10
 Dessens et al., 2014. Review of existing emissions pathways and evaluation of decarbonisation rates, AVOID 2 WPC1, June 2014. 
 
11
 UNEP 2013. The Emissions Gap Report 2013. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi. 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEPEmissionsGapReport2013.pdf. 
 
12
 Dessens et al., 2014. Review of existing emissions pathways and evaluation of decarbonisation rates, AVOID 2 WPC1, June 2014. 
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Table 2 Greenhouse gas emissions targets in 2030 based on a range of effort-sharing approaches under the median scenario B of 
50-66% chance of avoiding global warming of more than 2°C without substantial deployment of negative e missions technologies 
(percentage change on 2010 emissions). 
  
BAU (Mt 
CO2e) BAU 
Carbon 
budget 
Brazilian 
approach 
Contraction & 
Convergence 
CBD 
Convergence 
Equal 
cost 
Cost 
effective 
Income 
based Median 
India 5,297 94% 202% 51% 36% 94% 28% 24% 32% 36% 
China 16,786 59% -22% 20% -6% -17% 1% -3% 4% -3% 
Indonesia 1,274 54% 64% -6% 3% 54% -8% -11% -5% -5% 
Mexico 852 19% -20% -31% -15% 0% -21% -13% -19% -19% 
South Africa 640 20% -75% -39% -26% -34% -29% -44% -26% -34% 
Canada 941 16% -99% -34% -33% -41% -30% -27% -36% -34% 
Russia 2,715 11% -93% -40% -31% -39% -27% -36% -25% -36% 
South Korea 825 6% -81% -33% -45% -51% -34% -27% -38% -38% 
USA 6,867 5% -99% -45% -40% -47% -35% -27% -40% -40% 
EU 4,196 -9% -65% -63% -33% -40% -43% -33% -48% -43% 
Japan 1,331 0% -72% -50% -34% -42% -44% -29% -48% -44% 
Brazil 2,359 8% -72% -40% -40% -47% -46% -45% -45% -45% 
Oceania 819 3% -98% -41% -49% -55% -49% -46% -52% -49% 
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Table 3 Greenhouse gas emissions targets in 2030 based on a range of effort share approaches under the scenario A for greater 
than 66% chance of limiting global temperature rise to no more 2°C (percentage change on 2010 emission s). 
  
BAU 
(Mt 
CO2e) BAU 
Carbon 
budget 
Brazilian 
approach 
Contraction 
& 
Convergence 
CBD 
Convergence 
Equal 
cost 
Cost 
effective 
Income 
based Median 
India 5,297 94% 154% 38% 4% 94% 11% 7% 16% 16% 
Indonesia 1,274 54% 35% -24% -20% 54% -22% -27% -19% -20% 
China 16,786 59% -35% 8% -21% -41% -22% -29% -17% -22% 
Mexico 852 19% -34% -46% -31% -43% -32% -25% -30% -32% 
South Korea 825 6% -85% -46% -54% -66% -40% -33% -44% -46% 
Russia 2,715 11% -96% -56% -42% -56% -39% -48% -36% -48% 
Canada 941 16% -102% -50% -44% -58% -43% -40% -52% -50% 
South Africa 640 20% -82% -57% -38% -54% -43% -54% -39% -54% 
Brazil 2,359 8% -79% -55% -51% -63% -54% -52% -53% -54% 
Japan 1,331 0% -78% -66% -45% -59% -50% -38% -58% -58% 
USA 6,867 5% -102% -60% -50% -62% -52% -41% -58% -58% 
EU 4,196 -9% -73% -80% -44% -58% -54% -42% -61% -58% 
Oceania 819 3% -100% -54% -57% -68% -58% -52% -63% -58% 
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Table 4 Greenhouse gas emissions targets in 2030 based on a range of effort share approaches under the scenario C for pathways 
that deliver at the top end of the 50-66% chance of limiting global warming to no more than 2°C range and a 50-66% probability of a 
median 2.5°C rise in temperature (percentage change  on 2010 emissions). 
  
BAU (Mt 
CO2e) BAU 
Carbon 
budget 
Brazilian 
approach 
Contraction & 
Convergence 
CBD 
Convergence 
Equal 
cost 
Cost 
effective 
Income 
based Median 
India 5,297 94% 279% 73% 86% 94% 65% 66% 67% 73% 
Indonesia 1,274 54% -3% 39% 19% 17% 32% 31% 34% 31% 
China 16,786 59% 109% 24% 37% 54% 23% 13% 26% 26% 
Mexico 852 19% 3% -6% 10% 13% -2% 2% -1% 2% 
South Africa 825 6% -65% -10% -5% -7% -6% -12% -5% -7% 
Canada 2,715 11% -96% -9% -17% -18% -10% -10% -13% -13% 
Russia 941 16% -88% -15% -14% -16% -8% -13% -7% -14% 
South Korea 640 20% -73% -14% -31% -32% -14% -8% -18% -18% 
USA 2,359 8% -96% -20% -25% -27% -15% -11% -19% -20% 
Japan 1,331 0% -61% -25% -17% -19% -22% -11% -26% -22% 
Brazil 6,867 5% -61% -16% -24% -25% -21% -35% -17% -24% 
EU 4,196 -9% -53% -36% -14% -16% -29% -21% -32% -29% 
Oceania 819 3% -94% -19% -35% -37% -33% -33% -36% -35% 
  
Annex 3: Approach to international bunkers and peat emissions 
International bunkers 
Some emissions are generated from international aviation and maritime sources, 
which either cannot be allocated to a particular country or would cause significant 
economic disadvantage to do so. Therefore they are treated as separate bunkers. 
However, there is no GDP of aviation, and so cannot be easily allocated in equal cost 
and income approaches. Similarly for the other four approaches, as there is no 
population for aviation, it is not possible to calculate a contraction and convergence, 
or carbon space approach. Therefore, for every approach, the international bunkers 
were given a target for the mitigation required under the cost-effective approach. The 
rationale for this is that if all countries are taking ambitious global action it is expected 
that some action would be required from bunkers – it would be economically irrational 
for planes and ships not to make some efficiency measures and instead assign more 
emissions reductions to countries. In the absence of any other option, the cost-
effective amount of reductions was decided as a realistic amount for bunkers to 
undertake. 
Peat emissions 
For GLOCAF modelling, the allowable emissions are reduced by 1.5Gt to take 
account of peat degradation and peat-fire emissions. Therefore, if the target is a 
global emissions level of 41 gigatonnes in 2030, the emissions allocated between all 
countries would be only 39.5 gigatonnes. The rationale for this is that these are not 
included in the BAU estimates, and the BAU for Indonesia (where many peat fires 
occur) in particular appears to be short by around this amount. We considered 
reducing the 1.5Gt in 2030 by the amount that Indonesia reduces its other emissions, 
on the grounds that if action is being taken elsewhere it is likely that some action 
would be taken against peat fires. However, in some scenarios the reduction for 
Indonesia was not large, so it was felt most justifiable to leave it at the same level as 
the present day, rather than having different reductions in different scenarios. There 
is significant uncertainty around acceptable emissions levels for particular 
temperature rises, so this more cautious approach helps to allow for some of that 
uncertainty. 
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